Supplier quality improvement: The value of information under uncertainty by Quigley, John et al.
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: EOR [m5G; June 14, 2017;4:57 ] 
European Journal of Operational Research 0 0 0 (2017) 1–16 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
European Journal of Operational Research 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor 
Supplier quality improvement: The value of information under 
uncertainty 
John Quigley a , Lesley Walls a , ∗, Güven Demirel b , c , Bart L. MacCarthy b , Mahdi Parsa a 
a Department of Management Science, University of Strathclyde, William Duncan Building, 130 Rottenrow, Glasgow G4 0GE, UK 
b Operations Management and Information Systems Division, Nottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, Nottingham NG8 1BB, UK 
c Management Science and Entrepreneurship Group, Essex Business School, University of Essex, Southend-On-Sea SS1 1LW, UK 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 8 January 2016 
Accepted 21 May 2017 
Available online xxx 
Keywords: 
Supply chain management 
Risk analysis 
Uncertainty modelling 
Decision analysis 
Manufacturing 
a b s t r a c t 
We consider supplier development decisions for prime manufacturers with extensive supply bases pro- 
ducing complex, highly engineered products. We propose a novel modelling approach to support supply 
chain managers decide the optimal level of investment to improve quality performance under uncertainty. 
We develop a Poisson–Gamma model within a Bayesian framework, representing both the epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainties in non-conformance rates. Estimates are obtained to value a supplier quality im- 
provement activity and assess if it is worth gaining more information to reduce epistemic uncertainty. 
The theoretical properties of our model provide new insights about the relationship between the degree 
of epistemic uncertainty, the effectiveness of development programmes, and the levels of investment. We 
ﬁnd that the optimal level of investment does not have a monotonic relationship with the rate of ef- 
fectiveness. If investment is deferred until epistemic uncertainty is removed then the expected optimal 
investment monotonically decreases as prior variance increases but only if the prior mean is above a 
critical threshold. We develop methods to facilitate practical application of the model to industrial deci- 
sions by a) enabling use of the model with typical data available to major companies and b) developing 
computationally eﬃcient approximations that can be implemented easily. Application to a real indus- 
try context illustrates the use of the model to support practical planning decisions to learn more about 
supplier quality and to invest in improving supplier capability. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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0. Introduction and industrial motivation 
Our research is motivated by engagement with major manufac-
uring companies that make complex, high value engineered prod-
cts. The companies with which we have collaborated are respon-
ible for the design, manufacture and assembly of parts but, given
he nature of their ﬁnal products, are also systems integrators of
arts that are procured from global supply chains. The responsi-
ilities of supply chain management within these organisations in-
lude selecting and developing suppliers, as well as ensuring a suf-
cient supply of parts to the required speciﬁcation to meet produc-
ion demands. These supply bases are extensive and often there is
 long lead time with initial contracting of new suppliers happen-
ng 3–5 years ahead of the delivery of supplied parts. ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: j.quigley@strath.ac.uk (J. Quigley), lesley.walls@strath.ac.uk (L. 
alls), guven.demirel@essex.ac.uk (G. Demirel), bart.maccarthy@nottingham.ac.uk 
B.L. MacCarthy), mahdi.parsa@agriculture.gov.au (M. Parsa). 
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Please cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0Company operations are underpinned by large databases con-
aining information on suppliers (e.g. commodity grouping, tech-
ology maturity, geographical location), items (e.g. unit price, lead
ime, design ownership), and orders (e.g. volumes, delivery status,
uality conformance). Routine management reports include data
nalysis to provide information about supplier performance. Com-
any cultures encourage and embrace rational analysis for opera-
ional decision-making. These include decisions to undertake dif-
erent kinds of activities for poorly performing suppliers and to
lan interactions with some suppliers to avoid future problems.
upplying parts at the required quality level is fundamental to
chieve the desired level of performance. Supplier development
s a costly activity for the companies because it requires deploy-
ent of skilled personnel for substantial periods of time. The de-
loyment of such resources requires consideration of the costs and
ffectiveness of activities. It is within this industrial context that
e seek to help management (1) to assess how much it is worth
pending to improve supplier quality performance and (2) to un-
erstand whether there is value in learning more about supplier
uality capabilities. nder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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d  Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell (1998) describe supplier devel-
opment as “any set of activities undertaken by a buying ﬁrm to iden-
tify, measure and improve supplier performance and facilitate the con-
tinuous improvement of the overall value of goods and services sup-
plied to the buying company’s business unit”. In considering the two
challenges posed by our industry problem, we distinguish between
two types of activity: those that primarily will help us learn more
about the state of a supplier’s current capabilities, such as plant
visits, auditing ( Handley & Gray, 2013; Mayer, Nickerson, & Owan,
2004 ); and those interventions primarily designed to improve sup-
plier quality, such as supplier training, allocating buyer personnel
to improve the supplier’s technical base and operations ( Krause,
Handﬁeld, & Scannell, 1998; Krause, Handﬁeld, & Tyler, 2007 ). We
can then conceptualise a modelling approach that incorporates a
two stage decision process, considering how much should be in-
vested in supplier quality improvement activities and whether it is
valuable to make an investment now or after learning more about
the supplier. These decisions are made under uncertainty about the
true quality level that a supplier will achieve. The degree of un-
certainty will be inﬂuenced by how much experience the buying
ﬁrm has with a supplier. For established suppliers with whom the
buyer has a long history about quality achieved, the uncertainties
may be less than for a supplier who is more recently integrated
into the buying ﬁrm’s supply base. 
To build a meaningful model we need to understand the nature
of uncertainties affecting supplier quality performance. Our general
model is developed with parameters to reﬂect quality uncertain-
ties. A distinctive feature of our approach is that we distinguish
between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, which relate respec-
tively to those uncertainties that are regarded as irreducible and
those that are reducible if more information is collected ( Hoffman
& Hammonds, 1994 ). Generally, epistemic uncertainty represents
some degree of ignorance or incomplete information about the sys-
tem or aspects of the system of interest, and importantly such un-
certainty can be reduced as information is collected. In contrast,
aleatory uncertainty describes the inherent random variation that
is a property of the system and is therefore not considered re-
ducible ( Bedford & Cooke, 2001 ). In operational quality systems an
improvement in capability would be realised by a reduction in the
process variation resulting from a decision to develop a supplier’s
quality performance ( Kotz & Lovelace, 1998 ). Epistemic uncertainty
in this context is concerned with the a priori state of knowledge
about a supplier’s process capability and is expressed before mak-
ing the decision to develop a supplier or not. Learning by the buyer
about a supplier’s true quality capability reduces epistemic uncer-
tainty. 
We develop a stochastic model within a Bayesian framework to
capture both the epistemic uncertainty associated with true sup-
plier quality performance as well as the aleatory uncertainty asso-
ciated with the inherent randomness in a supplier’s performance
such as that observed in quality performance data. Our approach is
grounded in the value of information concept that data has value
if, once analysed, it can result in a change of decision ( Ketzenberg,
Rosenzweig, Marucheck, & Metters, 2007; Wagner, 1969 ). We con-
sider value to be a combination of the likelihood of changing a
decision and the magnitude of its consequence. By formulating an
appropriate stochastic model we can estimate the uncertainty as-
sociated with the decision consequences, assign likelihoods to pos-
sible data and update the stochastic model in view of data. 
We consider a context where we have a dominant prime en-
tity (the buyer), such as one of the major manufacturers with
which we work, that relies on an extensive base of suppliers. We
therefore assume a single buying organisation with multiple sup-
pliers that have been selected according to the buyer’s standard
procurement process. Thus, for a new supplier there is insight
into anticipated quality performance based on evidence from, forPlease cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0xample, quality process reviews, quality certiﬁcation, quality
chieved for similar parts, or ﬁrst article inspections. For those
uppliers that have supplied parts to the buyer, data will also ex-
st on quality performance achieved historically. Our model is in-
ended to be most useful for those suppliers whose relationship
ith the buyer is relatively new and for whom a proactive ap-
roach to development will be taken, for example, during the pe-
iod between signing a contract and delivery of the regular supply
f orders. This is because in such cases epistemic uncertainty is
ikely to be greater than for suppliers with whom the relationship
s more mature. 
We do not consider the choice of activity beyond the two
lasses of development noted above; learning and improvement.
ur model requires as inputs an expression of the buyer’s assess-
ent of epistemic uncertainty in the true supplier quality, as well
s the ﬁnancial value of production losses that will be incurred by
he buyer if sub-standard parts are supplied, and an assessment
f the effectiveness of development activity. The model provides
he level of the optimal investment in a supplier improvement ac-
ivity with an upper bound on the amount it is worth spending
o reduce the epistemic uncertainty about the supplier quality by
argeting learning activities before investing in improvement. Such
esults help the manager to screen suppliers to assess whether it
s worth conducting additional plant visits, audits or other learning
ctivities ﬁrst, or whether it is more appropriate to invest directly
n, for example, training, deployment of buyer resources into the
upplier, root cause analysis or other activities aimed at directly
aking quality improvements. 
In this study we address the challenge posed by a practi-
al industry problem by developing and evaluating an innova-
ive and applicable modelling solution using a sound mathemat-
cal methodology. Our principal contribution is a new modelling
ramework for supplier development taking into account the value
f information. The model is grounded in the theory of decision
nalysis and statistical inference, and is aligned with an important
ndustrial supply management problem for which we develop a
ethodology to support implementation with real data. Our model
ddresses gaps in the existing literature in relation to research on
upplier development and the value of information within a supply
hain quality management context. The existing literature tends
argely either to develop mathematical models for assumed scenar-
os providing insightful thinking tools, or to discuss the theory and
ractice of supplier development in an operational supply manage-
ent context. 
We examine the literature relevant to our problem context and
osition our work in relation to existing empirical knowledge and
odels on supplier development in Section 2 . Our scientiﬁc mod-
lling contribution is described in Section 3 . We explain how we
ormulate the stochastic model based on assumptions about the
robabilistic representation of uncertainties and present a number
f propositions related to properties of the model. We develop an
xact solution for the expected value under perfect information,
hich is the limiting case of buying down epistemic uncertainty
hrough learning activities. To support practical implementation,
e derive a computational approximation and evaluate the condi-
ions under which it is accurate. Section 4 presents an application
f our model to real, albeit de-sensitised, industry data on supplier
on-conformance rates for a set of key tier 1 suppliers to a large
ndustrial prime. We present an empirical Bayes method to esti-
ate the prior distribution representing the epistemic uncertainty
n supplier performance using typical data contained in industry
atabases. After discussing the reasonableness of our assumptions
iven the industry problem and data, we present a selection of
ays in which the ﬁndings of our model can be communicated
o supply chain managers. Section 5 presents our conclusions and
iscusses the implications of our ﬁndings for practice and theory,nt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
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e  ncluding identifying future challenges and opportunities for fur-
her work. 
. Positioning within scientiﬁc literature 
Our research relates to several strands of the supply chain man-
gement and decision sciences literatures. We brieﬂy review semi-
al studies on supplier development in order to position our mod-
lling approach appropriately within this context. We critically re-
iew those studies that focus on modelling the value of informa-
ion in supply chains with a particular emphasis on the treatment
f uncertainties. 
.1. Supplier development 
Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell (1998) , Che and Hausch (1999) ,
nd Krause, Handﬁeld, and Tyler (2007) provide detailed accounts
f supplier development approaches in practice. In particular,
rause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell (1998) present a general represen-
ation of a supplier development process grounded in an extensive
ndustry survey. From our contemporary company engagement, the
dentiﬁed process still typiﬁes many aspects of current practice. For
xample, critical commodities and suppliers are identiﬁed, key per-
ormance areas are targeted, appropriate teams are formed, and ac-
ivities are selected, implemented and reviewed. Interestingly, one
tep in the general process notes that “opportunities and probability
or improvement” through supplier development should be identi-
ed. However, no further consideration is given as to how such
robabilities should be expressed, although criteria such as the po-
ential to inﬂuence the supplier development process, resources re-
uired in terms of people and time, as well as the potential re-
urn on investment are discussed. Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell
1998) pose the question “what criteria should be used to identify
uppliers that have high probability of development success?”. Our
odel helps to answer this question by estimating the value of
aining more information about supplier quality and providing a
robabilistic assessment of the risks of such investments, given the
egree of epistemic uncertainty, as well as the buyer’s assessment
f the potential to develop the supplier. 
Krause, Handﬁeld, and Scannell (1998) classify supplier devel-
pment activities into reactive and strategic approaches. Reactive
pproaches are the ﬁrst stage in the development process where
nvestment is made into poorly performing suppliers to undertake
orrective actions. Strategic supplier development, on the other
and, is applied at a more advanced stage where the buyer devel-
ps a strategic plan for the supply base to increase the long-term
apability of the supply network. We position our approach in be-
ween these extremes, essentially as a tuned proactive approach,
hich estimates the value of collecting further information on sup-
lier capability in order to mitigate the risk of poor quality and
void extensive exposure to risks of a supplier failing to perform. 
Supply chain managers are interested in multiple performance
easures; Ward, McCreery, Ritzman, and Sharma (1998) high-
ight four priorities — quality, delivery, ﬂexibility and cost. Krause,
andﬁeld, and Tyler (2007) note that quality has been recognised
s important in manufacturing since the 1980s and continues to be
f considerable concern since end customer perceptions of the ﬁnal
roduct quality will be impacted by the quality of parts manufac-
ured by suppliers. They ﬁnd that performance outcomes in qual-
ty, as well as delivery and ﬂexibility, are affected by direct involve-
ent of the buyer’s personnel in supplier development. Hence,
eciding how much to invest in interventions aimed at improv-
ng supplier quality remains an important business challenge more
enerally beyond our motivating industrial problem. 
Supplier development has been previously investigated in sev-
ral modelling studies. Based on the primary methodology used,Please cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0e classify the literature into (1) game theoretical studies and (2)
tochastic modelling approaches. 
Most game theoretical studies focus on strategic supplier de-
elopment for production cost reduction ( Bernstein & Kok, 2009;
ida, 2007; Iyer, Schwarz, & Zenios, 2005; Kim & Netessine, 2013;
i, Hyun-Soo, & Amitabh, 2015 ). For instance, Bernstein and Kok
2009) consider cost reduction investments of suppliers in an as-
embly network where the effectiveness of cost-contingent and
arget-price contracts in promoting investments and increasing
roﬁts is analysed. Similarly, Iida (2007) considers an assembly
etwork where both the buyer and the suppliers might invest in
ost reduction, showing that effort compensation and cost sharing
greements can enable supply chain coordination. Although cost
eduction effort may be interpreted as a means to satisfy certain
uality requirements, quality is not given explicit consideration in
hese studies. More related to our approach is the study by Zhu,
hang, and Tsung (2007) that explicitly investigates the improve-
ent of a supplier’s quality where both the buyer and the sup-
lier can invest to decrease the non-conformance rate, showing
hat investment by only the party with higher investment effec-
iveness is suﬃcient unless there are resource constraints. Our re-
earch differs from these game theoretical studies in two ways.
irst, we consider the problem from the buyer’s perspective be-
ause we adopt a client decision support focus. Second, our ap-
roach is based on real-world data, both empirical and judgemen-
al. In contrast, game-theoretical studies in the literature are more
eneral and make idealistic assumptions in particular regarding
ncertainty, as we explore further below. 
Stochastic programming has been used to study supplier de-
elopment in a more limited number of studies ( Friedl & Wag-
er, 2012; Wang, Gilland, & Tomlin, 2010 ). For instance, Wang,
illand, and Tomlin (2010) use a two-stage stochastic program-
ing framework where in the ﬁrst stage the buyer selects the in-
estment levels, and based on their returns, which are subject to
ariation, the order quantities are selected. Of more interest to our
roblem, Talluri, Narasimhan, and Chung (2010) and Hosseininasab
nd Ahmadi (2015) study strategic supplier development using
arkowitz-type mean-variance risk models to formulate the op-
imal levels of investment in a set of suppliers. Hosseininasab and
hmadi (2015) note the importance of taking into account future
erformance and anticipated changes in the development of sup-
liers. They also discuss the use of databases to identify trends and
orrelations in supplier performance although they use only syn-
hetically generated data for supplier quality, delivery, price and
nancial position. Our approach differs from these studies in sev-
ral ways. First, we consider only quality, unlike authors who fo-
us on multiple performance measures, see, for example, the re-
iew by Ho, Xu, and Dey (2010) . Second, our model provides the
xpected return on investment in quality improvement as an out-
ut, rather than using it as a model input. Third, as mentioned
or game-theoretic models, we use real data rather than synthet-
cally generated data. Fourth, we consider a stochastic modelling
ramework to account for the potential reduction of epistemic un-
ertainty, which is not captured in Markowitz-type models. 
.2. Value of information 
The established concept of value of information (VOI) in
ecision analysis is predicated on the ability of additional infor-
ation to reduce epistemic uncertainty. Since Wagner (1969) ,
uch has been written about VOI. In the context of inventory
anagement in particular, the value of sharing information about
ustomer demand, forecasts, inventory level, and production ca-
acity for supply chain coordination, cost reduction, and bullwhip
ffect mitigation has been widely investigated; see reviews bynt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
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i  Sahin and Robinson (2002) and Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig,
Marucheck, and Metters (2007) . 
In their survey article on inventory management, Ketzenberg,
Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Metters (2007) describe VOI as the
marginal improvement in value through additional use of infor-
mation relative to some base scenario, where the base scenario
represents a given set of information that can be compared to
the value gained from the so-called information scenario, which
is structurally identical to the base scenario except that additional
information is shared. The authors argue there is growing inter-
est in VOI because of the increasing opportunities to gain more
information due to the growth in e-commerce. They discuss differ-
ent sources of uncertainty, distinguished as random and system-
atic, which relate to the stochastic and structural characteristics
of the system and so could be considered equivalent to aleatory
and epistemic uncertainties, respectively. More generally, much has
been written about uncertainty in supply chain management with
different classiﬁcations being proposed; see, for example, the re-
view by Simangunsong, Hendry, and Stevenson (2012) . 
Interestingly, Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Metters
(2007) also formulate several propositions about VOI in an inven-
tory management context. Of most relevance to us are the fol-
lowing, which we paraphrase as follows: (1) VOI is higher when
there is greater uncertainty and (2) VOI is higher when there is in-
creased responsiveness. Based on a regression analysis of the em-
pirical data extracted from their literature review, strong support is
found for the second and partial support for the ﬁrst proposition.
In our concluding discussions, we reﬂect upon these propositions
with regard to our modelling theory and application in a quality
management context. 
The supply chain quality management literature contains arti-
cles that focus upon decision models related to supplier quality
and include the treatment of uncertainty. In the agency settings
of such studies, one or both parties involved in a buyer-supplier
relation might beneﬁt from hiding private information, leading to
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. In such settings the
other party needs to provide incentives to establish coordination
or incur an information ‘rent’ to reveal the hidden information.
As discussed above in the context of supplier development, Zhu,
Zhang, and Tsung (2007) build a model to determine which invest-
ment options in quality improvement are optimal for both parties
when buyer production is outsourced to a supplier. Aleatory uncer-
tainty in the supplier quality control process is modelled in terms
of the non-conformance rate and the quality costs incurred by both
the supplier and the buyer are explicated. Although the relative
states of knowledge of the buyer and supplier are acknowledged,
no consideration is given to the articulation of such epistemic un-
certainty as a probability distribution. 
In contrast, Lim (2001) and Corbett, Zhou, and Tang (2004) dis-
cuss the explicit mathematical representation of uncertainties as
prior probabilities in the context of buyer-supplier contracting de-
cisions. Neither study uses the term epistemic uncertainty, but
the concept is clear from the explicit consideration given to ex-
ante views of buyers and the use of prior probability distributions
within the models. Lim (2001) develops a buyer decision model
for contract option selections when there is uncertainty in supplier
quality; expressing a prior probability on the supplier’s technology
type to provide a probabilistic assessment of the fraction of de-
fective parts anticipated to be supplied to the buyer. The increas-
ing role of e-commerce data as a motivation for such modelling is
identiﬁed, with the authors commenting that the visibility of part
quality data afforded by shared database systems can impact the
degree of information asymmetry between the buyer and the sup-
plier. This observation is contextually important for our problem. 
Corbett, Zhou, and Tang (2004) assume a bilateral buyer-
supplier monopoly within which they examine scenarios to assessPlease cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0OI of multiple contract types. They assume the supplier holds a
rior distribution that expresses her uncertainty about the buyer’s
nternal variable costs. The decision model is developed for a gen-
ral prior distribution represented by a continuous probability dis-
ribution function, although numerical experiments examine vari-
us distributional forms of the assumed prior as a form of sensi-
ivity analysis. Different parameter value sets are selected to inves-
igate the effects of controlling the degree of change in the prior
ean and variance. Thus, they are, in effect, exploring the effects
f different degrees of epistemic uncertainty on their decisions.
e adopt an equivalent approach, although we explore sensitivity
o changes in the degree of epistemic uncertainty expressed using
eal data. 
While different ways of mathematically representing prior
robabilities have been articulated by Lim (2001) and especially
y Corbett, Zhou, and Tang (2004) , there has been no considera-
ion of how such distributions might be speciﬁed in an industrial
ecision-making context. We show how typically available industry
ata can be used to form meaningful, rather than assumed, prior
istributions to represent epistemic uncertainty. 
. A modelling framework for valuing supplier development 
Our modelling concept is illustrated using a decision tree
hown in Fig. 1 . The buyer needs to choose whether or not to in-
est in activities to improve supplier quality (upper two branches)
r whether to gather more information to learn about supplier
uality capability before investing in improvement activities (lower
ranch). The decision tree is a visual simpliﬁcation with a binary
good or poor) representation of supplier quality. Our full model
onsiders the occurrence of poor quality events that risk delaying
r disrupting supply to the buyer as measured by the number of
on-conformances within some period of buyer exposure to risk.
he exposure to risk could be measured by, for example, the calen-
ar time or the number of parts ordered from the supplier. We at-
ach a probability distribution to the uncertainties associated with
upplier quality. Not shown in the diagram are the buyer valua-
ions associated with each decision pathway, which we measure as
he buyer’s loss due to poor supplier quality. The model allows us
o determine the highest amount the buyer be prepared to spend
n the time window between contracting the new supplier and de-
ivery of orders to learn more about a supplier to reduce epistemic
ncertainty about the true quality performance. Hence it supports
he manager in assessing whether it is worth learning more be-
ore making choices about improvement activities, or whether it is
etter to make improvement decisions in light of the current state
f knowledge. If the latter option is deemed more worthy, then
he model further allows the manager to decide whether to invest,
r not, in improvement activities and also how much it is worth
pending to improve supplier quality should this option be chosen.
.1. Modelling assumptions about the stochastic nature of uncertainty
Let N denote the random variable, number of non-
onformances, and let t denote the exposure to risk of non-
onformances to the buyer. We assume that the mean number
f non-conformances is proportional to the exposure to risk. We
odel N as a Poisson random variable with parameter , which
enotes the non-conformance rate in proportion to exposure.
xposure may be measured on a continuous (e.g. time) or discrete
e.g. order size) scale. When exposure is measured by a continuous
etric then a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) is rather than
s a special case of our model. The Poisson model is the simplest
odel for the number of non-conformances that is both popular in
he literature ( Montgomery, 2013 ) and is reasonable for our empir-
cal data, as we shall show in Section 4 . The aleatory uncertaintynt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
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Fig. 1. Model concept as a simpliﬁed decision tree of buyer decisions ( ) and supplier quality uncertainties ( ) . 
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iepresenting the natural variation in the non-conformance rate is
odelled by the Poisson probability distribution conditioned on
nowing  = λ as in Eq. (3.1) . 
 ( N = n |  = λ) = ( λt ) 
n 
e −λt 
n ! 
, t > 0 , λ > 0 , n = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . (3.1)
ractically, we shall not precisely know a supplier’s true non-
onformance rate, and so we describe our epistemic uncertainty
n the value of this parameter, λ, through a prior probability dis-
ribution, denoted by π ( λ). We assume π ( λ) can be described by
 Gamma distribution as shown in Eq. (3.2) . The Gamma distribu-
ion is a conjugate prior to the Poisson model and hence is math-
matically tractable giving it popularity as the Poisson–Gamma
odel ( Carlin & Louis, 2009 ). More importantly, the Gamma dis-
ribution with shape and scale parameters, α and β , respectively,
rovides a ﬂexible family of distributional shapes through which
pistemic uncertainty can be expressed probabilistically. 
( λ) = β
αλα−1 e −βλ
( α) 
, α > 0 , β > 0 , λ > 0 . (3.2)
If new data becomes available in the form of n 0 observed non-
onformance events for a risk exposure of t 0 then, using Bayes The-
rem, we can update the prior in Eq. (3.2) with the new data to
btain the posterior distribution. This will also be in the form of a
amma distribution with a change in parameters as shown in Eq.
3.3) . 
( λ| n 0 , t 0 ) = ( β + t 0 ) 
αλα+ n 0 −1 e −( β+ t 0 ) λ
( α + n 0 ) 
, 
α > 0 , β > 0 , λ > 0 , t 0 > 0 , n 0 = 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . (3.3) 
The prior in Eq. (3.2) represents our epistemic uncertainty
bout the true supplier quality given our knowledge of that sup-
lier to date. Our future experience with the supplier will result
n a new prior, which is effectively the posterior distribution ex-
ressed in Eq. (3.3) . Intuitively, as we gain more knowledge ofPlease cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0he supplier, our epistemic uncertainty should reduce. Asymptot-
cally as t 0 approaches ∞ , our epistemic uncertainty approaches
ero, because we shall have learnt everything about the true non-
onformance rate and so we are left only with the natural random
ariation described in Eq. (3.1) . 
.2. Speciﬁcation of a prior distribution 
As noted above, the prior distribution represents the buyer’s
pistemic uncertainty about the true non-conformance rate of an
ndividual supplier of interest. If several suppliers are candidates
or development by the buyer, then each supplier will be modelled
ndividually. Although we assume the prior comes from a common
amily of Gamma distributions, the buyer’s epistemic uncertainty
bout each individual supplier is represented by specifying appro-
riate parameter values for that supplier. 
Alternative modelling tactics can be adopted to specify a prior
istribution for a supplier. A prior can be constructed empiri-
ally. For example, Quigley and Walls (2017) describe a general
tructured process for eliciting the domain knowledge of an ex-
ert, such as a supply chain manager, to deﬁne reference factors
pon which relevant empirical data from existing suppliers can be
atched to the supplier of interest and subsequently veriﬁed as
n expression of the epistemic uncertainty in that supplier’s true
on-conformance rate. In this situation, the parameters of the
amma prior distribution require to be estimated statistically.
e show how this is accomplished using standard approaches in
he context of our industry example. Alternatively, the subjective
udgement of the buyer can be elicited using a structured expert
udgement process to express the buyer’s epistemic uncertainty
n the supplier true non-conformance rate ( O’Hagan et al., 2006;
uigley, Bedford, & Walls, 2008 ). A subjective prior distribution is
ppropriate if the expert believes s/he has more information than
s contained in the relevant empirical data. nt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
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Table 1 
Interpretation of elasticity ( 	) in terms of effectiveness 
rate ( γ ) and optimal investment ( x ∗). 
Elasticity Impact of percentage increase in γ
	 ≤ −1 Decrease in x ∗ of at least a percent 
−1 < 	 < 0 Decrease in x ∗ less than a percent 
	 = 0 No change in x ∗
0 < 	 < 1 Increase in x ∗ less than a percent 
	 = 1 Increase in x ∗ of a percent 
	 > 1 Increase in x ∗ of greater than a percent 
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p  In the subsequent steps of our modelling framework, a prior
distribution is treated in the same way regardless of whether it
has been constructed empirically or subjectively. 
3.3. Optimal investment in supplier quality improvement activity 
Let x denote the level of investment in supplier quality im-
provement, where the anticipated beneﬁt is better capability and
reduced non-conformance. Let v denote the loss incurred by the
buyer from a single non-conformance, i.e. the unit cost of internal
quality failure to the buyer. Here, we consider v to be an exogenous
parameter that needs to be estimated by the buyer. Porter and
Rayner (1992) and Schiffauerova and Thomson (2006) provide gen-
eral reviews on the costs of quality. Following Nandakumar, Datar,
and Akella (1993) , in quantifying v consideration should be given
to penalties for production delays due to unavailable or unsuitable
parts, inventory holding costs for other parts used in lieu of non-
conforming parts, costs for rescheduling and switch-over to other
orders, and demand side costs of loss of goodwill, such as customer
defection and loss of potential future customers, due to the delays,
and so on. 
To associate the supplier investment level with the supplier
performance, we deﬁne γ as a measure of the effectiveness rate of
the improvement activity, where higher effectiveness is reﬂected
in larger values of γ . We consider a diminishing marginal return
of investment in the reduction of non-conformances. We employ
the mathematical formulation used by Porteus (1986) and Zhu,
Zhang, and Tsung (2007) , where the non-conformance rate reduces
at a fraction that decreases exponentially with increasing level of
investment. Namely, if the number of non-conformances is N in
the absence of a development investment, it is expected to de-
crease to Ne −γ x when x monetary units are invested and the ef-
fectiveness rate is γ . The effectiveness of a development activity
will depend upon, for example, the type and nature of improve-
ment considered, the familiarity of the buyer with the range of
parts supplied and production technologies used, and the nature
of the relationship between the buyer and the supplier in ad-
dition to the commitment of the particular supplier; these need
to be reﬂected in the value chosen for the parameter γ . In this
paper we focus upon modelling the epistemic uncertainty in the
non-conformance rate because we wish to apply our model us-
ing operational data available to the buyer. The effectiveness rate
parameter is represented as a single value, although as we show
in our industry example, the sensitivity of results to changes in
the speciﬁed rate of effectiveness can be examined. Future exten-
sions of our univariate stochastic model could accommodate mod-
elling of epistemic uncertainties on multiple parameters at the
cost of increased model complexity, computational and elicitation
burdens. 
Let P denote the proﬁt function expressed as the difference be-
tween the value associated with a reduction in the number of non-
conformances through the improvement activity, and the invest-
ment level, x , required to undertake the supplier quality improve-
ment, as shown in Eq. (3.4) . The initial term represents the reduc-
tion in buyer loss due to non-conformances before ( v N) and after
( v Ne −γ x ) quality improvement. 
P = v N 
(
1 − e −γ x 
)
− x. (3.4)
To obtain the optimal level of investment, we evaluate the ex-
pected proﬁt when epistemic uncertainty is represented by the
Gamma prior distribution in Eq. (3.2) . That is, we are consider-
ing the prior information scenario associated with the top two
branches of Fig. 1 . The expected proﬁt function derived is given
in Eq. (3.5) . 
E [ P ] = v α
β
t 
(
1 − e −γ x 
)
− x. (3.5)Please cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0he product of parameters v t in the expected proﬁt given in Eq.
3.5) measures the exposure of the buyer to the beneﬁt of the in-
estment. Consistent with the formulation of the Poisson model, t
ould be measured by, for example, the number of parts ordered
rom the supplier or the duration of projects for which it is antic-
pated that the supplier will work with the buyer, and the cost to
he buyer of each non-conforming part is v . This parametric formu-
ation can also accommodate a Net Present Value (NPV) weighting
f future beneﬁts as we show in Appendix A . The optimal invest-
ent level, x ∗, of the expected proﬁt function is given in Eq. (3.6) .
 
∗ = max 
( 
0 , 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
)
γ
) 
. (3.6)
rom Eq. (3.6) we can make several observations. First, suﬃciently
ow levels of effectiveness will result in zero investment in supplier
mprovement activity (middle branch of Fig. 1 ). Second, and less
bvious, the optimal investment level does not have a monotonic
elationship with the effectiveness rate. This leads us to formulate
roposition 1 . The proof is given in Appendix B . 
roposition 1. The elasticity, denoted by 	, of optimal investment
x ∗) with respect to the effectiveness rate ( γ )—the ratio of the per-
entage change in x ∗ with respect to the percentage change in γ—can
e expressed as: 
 = 1 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
) − 1 . 
mplying that if: 
n ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
)
> 1 , 
hen an increase in the effectiveness rate will result in a decrease in
ptimal investment. 
Table 1 summarises the interpretation of elasticity. Expressions
or the expected proﬁt at x ∗ can be obtained through substitution
f Eq. (3.6) into Eq. (3.5) to obtain Eq. (3.7) . Note that Eq. (3.7) pro-
ides an expectation, whereas the actual future outcome will vary
s illustrated in Fig. 1 . 
 [ P ; x ∗] = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎩ 
v tγ α
β
− 1 − ln 
(
v tγ α
β
)
γ
if v tγ
α
β
> 1 
0 if v tγ
α
β
≤ 1 
(3.7)
.4. Assessing worth of learning before investing based on expected 
alue of perfect information 
To provide the buyer with a useful means of assessing whether
here is value in activities to learn more about supplier quality we
ompute the expected proﬁt under an assumption of perfect infor-
ation. Expected value under perfect information (EVPI) does not
ndicate how much should be invested in a particular quality im-
rovement investment, which was described in Section 3.3 . Rather,nt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
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βstimating EVPI guides managers on how much it is worth spend-
ng to buy down epistemic uncertainty about the supplier’s true
on-conformance rate before investing in an improvement activity.
peciﬁcally, computing the expected value of information as the
ifference between the EVPI and the expected proﬁt without per-
ect information provides an assessment of how much it is worth
pending, at most, to remove all epistemic uncertainty, and hence
rovides an upper bound on the amount it would cost to reduce
ncertainty if information gained was partial and imperfect. This
aptures the lower branch of Fig. 1 . 
For the supplier’s true non-conformance rate, , we can deter-
ine the optimal investment decision under perfect information,
hich we denote by X PI as it is a function of the random variable
. Eq. (3.8) provides an expression for the expected value of proﬁt
nder perfect information given our modelling assumptions stated
n Section 3.1 . 
 [ P | x ∗ = X PI ] = 
{
v t γ−1 −ln ( v t γ) 
γ if v tγ > 1 
0 if v tγ ≤ 1 (3.8) 
ince the true supplier non-conformance rate is not known we
ake the expectation of Eq. (3.8) with respect to  using the prior
istribution given in Eq. (3.2) . Proposition 2 gives an analytic ex-
ression for the EVPI. The proof is shown in Appendix B . 
roposition 2. For the Poisson probability distribution given in Eq.
3.1) with a Gamma prior distribution for true non-conformance rate
iven in Eq. (3.2) and the objective function of form shown in Eq.
3.5) , then the Expected Value under Perfect Information (EVPI) can
e expressed as shown in Eq. (3.9) . 
VPI = 
v tγ α
β
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + 1 , βv tγ
))
− 1 + F 
(
1 ;α, βv tγ
)
γ
+ 
∞ ∑ 
i =1 
i ∑ 
j=0 
( i −1 ) ! 
( i − j ) ! j! ( −1 ) j 
( v tγ
β
) j ( α+ j ) 
( α) 
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + j, βv tγ
))
γ
(3.9) 
here F 
(
1 ;α + j, βv tγ
)
is the cumulative distribution function of a
amma distribution evaluated at 1 with shape parameter (α + j) and
cale parameter βv tγ given by 
 
(
1 ;α + j, β
v tγ
)
= 
( βv tγ ) 
α+ j e 
β
v tγ
(α + j) 
∞ ∑ 
k =0 
( βv tγ ) 
k ∏ k 
k 1 =0 (α + j + k 1 ) 
. 
Computing the expected value of perfect information (i.e.
VPI − E [ P ; x ∗] ) allows us to obtain an upper bound on how much
t is worth spending to learn more about a supplier before in-
esting in quality improvement. If this difference is less than
he expected cost of obtaining the supplier information, then Eq.
3.6) can be used to support the buyer decision to invest, or
ot, in supplier improvement (ﬁrst or second branch from top in
ig. 1 ). Otherwise, the buyer obtains more information ﬁrst to buy
own epistemic uncertainty by learning more about supplier qual-
ty (lowest branch in Fig. 1 ). 
.5. Sensitivity of optimal investment to prior variance 
It is interesting to explore how the optimal investment in sup-
lier quality improvement under perfect information, X PI , responds
o changes in the degree of epistemic uncertainty. We use the
rior standard deviation as a summary measure of epistemic un-
ertainty. Note also that re-expressing the parameters of the prior
istribution in terms of the mean and standard deviation can be
seful when communicating results to managers since they are
ore understandable. 
α
Please cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0Theorem 1 below shows that for situations where the true
on-conformance rate is above the investment threshold, that is
> 1 υtγ , the mean optimal level of investment under perfect in-
ormation is a monotonically decreasing function of the epistemic
ncertainty associated with the non-conformance rate. The proof
s shown in Appendix C . We note that the proof does not require
he prior to have the form of a Gamma distribution. 
heorem 1. If the non-conformance rate is greater than the min-
mum investment threshold, i.e.  > 1 υtγ , then for a ﬁxed mean
on-conformance rate μ
> 1 υtγ
= E 
[

∣∣ > 1 υtγ ], the expected opti-
al investment under perfect information is monotonically decreas-
ng with respect to non-conformance uncertainty, i.e. σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
=
 ar 
[

∣∣ > 1 υtγ ]. Speciﬁcally, ∂E 
[ 
X PI 
∣∣∣> 1 υtγ ] 
∂σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
< 0 . 
.6. Approximation for EVPI and computational accuracy 
Proposition 2 provides an expression for EVPI in terms of a
umulative Gamma distribution function. However, calculating the
VPI using Eq. (3.9) requires a degree of programming knowl-
dge, which might hinder the practical use of the method. Hence
roposition 3 below gives an upper bound approximation for the
VPI to facilitate easier application in, for example, spreadsheets.
e can also obtain a bound on the error between the true EVPI
nd its upper bound, as shown in Proposition 4 , and thus obtain a
ower bound on the EVPI. Proofs to both propositions are shown in
ppendix B . 
roposition 3. The following expression provides an upper bound
UB) for the EVPI expressed in Eq. (3.9) : 
VPI ≤ v t α
β
−
( α) − ln 
(
β
v tγ
)
γ
−
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
))
(3.10) 
here  is the digamma function. 
roposition 4. The error between the upper bound on the EVPI (UB)
Eq. (3.10) ) and the actual EVPI (Eq. (3.9) ) can be bounded as fol-
ows: 
v t 
α
β
−
( α) − ln 
(
β
v tγ
)
γ
−
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
))
− EV PI 
≤
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e − βv tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e − βv tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e − βv tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) . 
(3.11) 
We can characterise the parameter regions where the UB is a
ood approximation for the EVPI. That is, where the right-hand-
ide of Eq. (3.11) is suﬃciently small. Note that the bound in Eq.
3.11) is not a monotonic function of α. Corollary 1 establishes the
imits of this bound for either α or β when the other is held ﬁxed,
howing that the EVPI converges to the UB in these limits for large
or small β . 
orollary 1. For the limits of the error in the upper bound with re-
pect to α and β , the shape and scale parameters of the Gamma prior
istribution respectively, are zero for large α and small β . i.e.: 
lim 
→ 0 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e − βv tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e − βv tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e − βv tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) = 0 
lim →∞ 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e − βv tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e − βv tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e − βv tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) = 0 
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Fig. 2. Process showing relation between inputs and outputs when modelling a new supplier. Dotted lines show an alternative path when modelling an existing supplier. 
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p  The accuracy of the UB as an approximation for the actual EVPI
is assessed in Appendix C for a range of parameter values for α and
β . Our results show that the accuracy of the UB increases as the
shape parameter α increases, which is consistent with Corollary 1 .
In addition, its accuracy also increases for increasing values
of the effectiveness rate γ and decreasing values of the scale
parameter β . 
4. Industry example 
Fig. 2 summarises our general modelling framework and we
now discuss its application to a real industry problem for a large
manufacturing company making highly engineered heavy machin-
ery. The company has an extensive in-bound supply base. Lead
times can be long for new projects since initial contracting de-
cisions with critical suppliers can be made several years ahead.
During the time period before parts arrive, the company faces
the ‘buyer’s dilemma’ addressed by our modelling framework.
The core decision problems are whether or not to invest in ac-
tivities to improve quality or whether to invest in activities to
learn more about a supplier’s quality. This dilemma is particu-
larly acute for suppliers that are newly integrated into the buying
company’s supply base and for whom there may be little empiri-
cal evidence about the required part quality since initial contract-
ing and procurement information is limited to checks on certiﬁca-
tion, quality processes, and previous quality outcomes for related
products. 
4.1. Setting model parameters 
A modelling choice needs to be made about the approach
adopted to specify the prior distribution expressing the buyer’s
uncertainty of the new supplier’s true non-conformance rate. In
this study, the manager is able to construct a suitable compara-
tor pool of existing suppliers based on reference factors elicitedPlease cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0ollowing the methodology of Quigley and Walls (2017) . Moreover,
he records taken from the company ERP system provide relevant
on-conformance data for the suppliers in the comparator pool.
herefore, we elect to construct an empirical prior distribution in
his case. The steps in estimating the empirical prior distribution
re described in Section 4.2 . 
The model also requires as inputs an assessment of the effec-
iveness of the improvement activity and an estimate of the loss
ncurred by the manufacturer if non-conforming parts are sup-
lied. In this study, we investigate the impact of setting differ-
nt effectiveness rates on decision-making to cover a range of de-
rees of effectiveness for different types of improvement activi-
ies, the buyer’s familiarity with the supplier, the parts and tech-
ologies used, and different levels of supplier engagement. For the
urposes of this example, we set the buyer loss to be one unit
er non-conformance occurrence, i.e. v = 1 , to de-sensitise the cost
aluations. 
.2. Estimating an empirical prior distribution 
We use empirical data from company databases on the annual
requencies of non-conforming parts recorded over several years
or a comparator pool of 35 suppliers. To estimate the parame-
ers of the prior distribution using the selected data we adopt a
ethod, known as empirical Bayes, which has been used in a sim-
lar manner in technical risk analysis ( Quigley, Bedford, & Walls,
007; Quigley, Hardman, Bedford, & Walls, 2011 ) and also more
enerally ( Carlin & Louis, 2009 ). 
In order to obtain the Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE)
f the prior distribution’s parameters, we require an expression
or the predictive distribution that explains the relationship be-
ween the observed data and the prior parameters ( Good, 1976 ).
q. (4.1) shows the predictive distribution as a Negative Binomial
istribution, where N i denotes the number of non-conforming
arts for supplier i and t represents the exposure to risk for sup-i 
nt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
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Fig. 3. (a) Joint 95% conﬁdence region for the empirical prior mean and standard deviation of the true number of non-conforming parts per annum. (b) P–P plot of the 
predictive distribution against the empirical distribution. 
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w  lier i , which in this example is 1 year. We justify this choice
f exposure because we want to relate the supply risk to the
uyer’s manufacturing projects and so consider the implications
hen parts may not be available for assembly of the engineering
roduct. The remaining notation is the same as in Section 3 . 
 ( N i = n i ) = 
∞ ∫ 
0 
( λi t i ) 
n i e −λi k i 
n i ! 
βαλi 
α−1 
e −βλi 
( α) 
dλ
= ( n i + α) 
( α) n i ! 
(
β
β + t i 
)α(
t i 
β + t i 
)n i 
, 
α > 0 , β > 0 , n i = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . (4.1) 
sing the predictive distribution we construct the log-likelihood
unction for the data across the pool of 35 suppliers as follows: 
 ( α, β) ∝ 
35 ∑ 
i =1 
[
d i + α ln 
(
β
β + t i 
)
+ n i 
(
t i 
β + t i 
)]
here d i = 
⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
n i −1 ∑ 
j=0 
ln ( j + α) , if n i ≥ 1 
0 if n i = 0 . 
We obtain the MLE of the parameters of the empirical prior to
e ˆ α = 0 . 0879 and ˆ β = 0 . 0018 . Construction of joint conﬁdence re-
ions for the prior parameters are obtained using likelihood theory
 Lawless, 2003 ). Here, we re-parameterise the prior parameters to
xpress them in terms of the pool mean non-conformance rate ( μ)
nd standard deviation ( σ ), which we ﬁnd are more directly under-
tandable in reasoning about the meaning of the empirical prior
istribution with supply chain managers. Fig. 3 (a) illustrates the
5% joint conﬁdence region showing strong association between
he prior mean and standard deviation, which are 48.83 and 164.71
or this data set, respectively. The mean number of non-conforming
arts per annum in the pool is not likely to exceed 400 and the
tandard deviation in the non-conformance frequency is not likely
o be greater than 1400. 
Now that we have estimated the prior distribution, we can as-
ess the validity of our modelling assumptions. Fig. 3 (b) shows a
–P plot to assess the ﬁt of the estimated predictive distribution
odel to the empirical data. There is a good ﬁt in both extremes
f the distribution, although there are values below the 45 degree
eference line in the centre indicating that the model is more con-Please cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0ervative than the data in this region. However the ﬁt is good in
he upper right hand tail, which is important in our risk analysis
ince this is the high consequence situation where the true sup-
lier non-conformance rate may be relatively high. 
We now use the empirical prior distribution as a probability
odel representing the epistemic uncertainty in the true non-
onformance rate of the new supplier of interest. This Gamma
rior probability distribution function is shown in Fig. 4 (a) and
ndicates a high probability the true non-conformance rate will
e low, but the right tail in the distribution implies there re-
ains a relatively lower chance the true non-conformance rate of
he new supplier will be high. Using the MLE, ˆ α = 0 . 0879 and
ˆ = 0 . 0018 , we can update the uncertainty associated with the
rue non-conformance rate to obtain the predictive distribution
or the new supplier in the form of a Negative Binomial distribu-
ion with parameters ( ˆ  α + n i , ˆ β + t i ) . Since we only have informa-
ion from assessments obtained at initial contracting for the new
upplier, we have no data on the number of non-conformances
i.e. n i = t i = 0 ). Fig. 4 (b) shows this predictive distribution for the
umber of non-conforming parts per annum conditional on the oc-
urrence of at least one such event. The conditional distribution al-
ows us to illustrate the thick tail of the distribution which would
therwise be dominated by the outcome of zero non-conformances
ince this probability is estimated to be 0.57 for this data set. The
ecay of the tail of this conditional distribution is slow, implying
hat there is a signiﬁcant risk of many non-conforming parts being
elivered by the new supplier given our current state of knowledge
bout quality obtained from the pool. 
.3. Optimal investment in supplier quality improvement 
So, how much should the company be willing to invest to im-
rove the quality performance of the new supplier given prior lev-
ls of epistemic uncertainty? 
Using Eq. (3.6) we ﬁnd that the optimal investment to improve
he quality of the new supplier is 15 . 85 v when the effectiveness
ate of an improvement activity is γ = 0 . 1 , meaning that we would
xpect to invest up to nearly sixteen times the buyer loss of a non-
onformance in improving supplier non-conformance rate. If the
ffectiveness rate of an activity is γ = 0 . 5 , then the optimal value
f investment decreases to 6 . 40 v . Consistent with Proposition 1 ,
e ﬁnd that optimal investment in improvement activities of thent: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
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Fig. 4. (a) Prior distribution of uncertainty in the true non-conformance rate and (b) predictive distribution of number of non-conforming parts conditional on at least one 
non-conformance for the new supplier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Quantiles and mean of optimal proﬁts distribution un- 
der perfect information (in units of v ) for new suppli- 
ers to commodity group. 
Statistic Effectiveness of learning activity 
γ = 0 . 1 γ = 0 . 5 
Quantile 0.5 0 0 
0.75 0 6.02 
0.90 88.71 113.63 
0.99 915.39 956.78 
Mean 43.53 49.29 
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pnew supplier is lower for higher effectiveness rates. Note that the
expected proﬁts are 22 . 97 v and 40 . 44 v , respectively. 
However, these are expected proﬁts. Above we noted the pat-
tern of variation shown in the prior distribution. If the true non-
conformance rate of the new supplier is low (i.e. realised from the
left hand tail of the empirical prior distribution) then there re-
mains a risk that a loss will be incurred by implementing the im-
provement activity. For example, if the true non-conformance rate
is λ < 0.05 for an effectiveness rate of γ = 0 . 1 then the probabil-
ity of making a loss is 0.51; whereas if λ < 0.15 for γ = 0 . 5 then
the probability of making a loss is 0.46. We highlight these insights
because they allow managers to appreciate the level of risk asso-
ciated with making an immediate investment in supplier improve-
ment given prior uncertainty. 
We can further examine the relationships between the effec-
tiveness rate, optimal investment and expected proﬁt, given the
prior epistemic uncertainty as illustrated in Fig. 5 . Fig. 5 (a) shows
the optimal investment and expected proﬁt proﬁles, which are
both zero until the effectiveness rate is above the investment
threshold. Beyond this point, the expected proﬁt increases mono-
tonically with the effectiveness rate at a diminishing marginal rate
of increase. Expected investment is highest at low effectiveness
rates then decreases as the effectiveness rate increases, implying
that the higher effectiveness requires less investment to improve
proﬁts. In Fig. 5 (a) the expected proﬁt function is constrained to
be zero for low values of the effectiveness rate, unlike the surface
plot shown in Fig. 5 (b) where the zones of expected loss and proﬁt
can be identiﬁed. When effectiveness rate and optimal investment
increase, the expected proﬁt is highest. However, as optimal invest-
ment and/or effectiveness decrease, so too does expected proﬁt,
with high investment and low effectiveness resulting in expected
losses. 
4.4. Value of learning more about the supplier before investing in 
improvement 
So, should the company invest in activities to learn more about
supplier quality to reduce the epistemic uncertainty about the true
non-conformance rate? Please cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0When the effectiveness rate γ = 0 . 1 , we ﬁnd the expected
alue of perfect information, that is the difference between the
VPI and the expected proﬁt under prior uncertainty, to be 17 . 05 v .
his implies that if the buyer judges it is worth spending up to
ust over seventeen times the loss incurred by a supplied non-
onformance part to remove uncertainty about quality perfor-
ance then the best decision is to conduct additional learning be-
ore investing in an improvement activity. When the effectiveness
ate is γ = 0 . 5 , the expected value of perfect information reduces
o 5 . 44 v . 
We can further examine the likely ﬁnancial consequences of
pistemic uncertainty for the true quality performance of the new
upplier. Table 2 shows selected quantiles and the mean of the
istribution of optimal proﬁts under an assumption of perfect in-
ormation corresponding to no epistemic uncertainty. The results
resented in Table 2 indicate that investment in improvement is
ot optimal for a large proportion of suppliers new to the com-
odity group because we ﬁnd the optimal proﬁt is zero. How-
ver it is clear from values of the quantiles, and especially from
he relationship of the median to the mean, that this distribu-
ion is right skewed implying there is a small chance the new
upplier will merit relatively large investment. For example, 1% of
uch new suppliers to the commodity group would beneﬁt from
n investment at least 900 times the value of a non-conforming
art. nt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
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Fig. 5. Relationship between expected investment and optimal proﬁt, given a range of effectiveness rates for supplier improvement activity. Note in (a) solid is expected 
proﬁt and dashed is optimal investment and in (b) blue is expected proﬁt and red is expected loss. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the 
reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
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p  .5. Implications of epistemic uncertainty for decision-making 
Through our modelling we aim to support supply chain man-
gers to make informed decisions. Our goal is not to make the op-
imal decision itself. For this reason, we have presented a selec-
ion of results that are both typical of those shared with managers
n the manufacturing company and illustrate the behaviour of the
odel for different inputs. We summarise our key results in rela-
ion to the basic modelling concept shown in Fig. 1 . Let us consider
he situation where the supply chain manager is concerned with
n improvement activity which has an effectiveness rate judged
o be γ = 0 . 5 . Our analysis indicates that the manager should be
illing to invest up to 5 . 44 v to remove the epistemic uncertainty
bout the true non-conformance rate. If the costs of gathering ad-
itional information to learn more about supplier quality exceed
 . 44 v then the supply manager might decide to invest up to 6 . 40 v
irectly in the improvement activity. 
So far, our analysis has only considered the degree of epistemic
ncertainty at the two extremes: either as estimated by the em-
irical prior distribution; or totally removed. To further help the
anager develop an understanding of the impact of the degree
f epistemic uncertainty on optimal investment levels for supplier
mprovement, we can also examine the impact of changing the
rior standard deviation. Fig. 6 shows changes in the expected op-
imal investment under perfect information as the standard devi-
tion increases from zero through to 200, which is just above the
stimated prior standard deviation of 164.71. We also examine four
ases of changes in the prior mean around the point estimate of
8.83 to explore part of the conﬁdence region. As previously, we
onsider effectiveness rates of 0.1 and 0.5. We ﬁnd that regard-
ess of the effectiveness rate, the expected optimal investment as
 function of prior standard deviation is consistently less for lower
rior mean. For equivalent prior mean and standard deviation, the
xpected optimal investment is lower when effectiveness rate is
igher. 
In our industry example, the managers know the real value of
he loss incurred by non-conformance and, based on their procure-
ent knowledge, have informed opinions about the likely effec-
iveness rate of an improvement activity as well as the associated
ost. Our analysis provides them with a means of expressing their
f  
Please cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0ncertainty about supplier quality evidenced by their data and al-
ows them to investigate options for supplier development and for
nformation seeking activities with an understanding of the inher-
nt risks to inform their decision. 
. Discussion 
Our research has been motivated by engagement with industry
ractice and addresses an important academic topic on the value
f information in supplier development. Consequently we believe
e have developed a modelling framework that is both useful to
upply chain managers and makes a scientiﬁc contribution. Our
ractical motivation has led us to frame a distinctive decision prob-
em where we focus upon the buyer’s dilemma of investing in
ctivities to develop supplier quality performance and we aim to
ake effective and eﬃcient use of available industry data, both
mpirical and judgemental. Hence we have presented a modelling
olution that ﬁlls a gap in the literature between the management
onsiderations of the supplier development process and the sci-
nce of mathematically modelling abstract decision problems us-
ng, for example, stochastic programming or game theoretical ap-
roaches. 
.1. Conclusions and contributions 
Practically, our modelling process has proved valuable to the in-
ustry practitioners with whom we have been collaborating since
hey need to allocate their limited resources to a range of devel-
pment activities in the context of an extensive number of suppli-
rs. Importantly, by focusing on the expected value of perfect infor-
ation we help to quickly identify those new suppliers for which
here will be no economic beneﬁt in obtaining any further infor-
ation before the actual improvement investment and those oth-
rs for which further information is essential. This type of decision
id is critical for prime companies with large supply bases. 
Scientiﬁcally, our major contributions and insights are as fol-
ows. We provide closed form solutions for the optimal level of in-
estment and expected proﬁt under no and perfect information.
e establish that the optimal investment level in supplier im-
rovement does not have a monotonic relationship with the ef-
ectiveness rate of that activity. Through Theorem 1 we have pro-nt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
44 
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Fig. 6. Relationship between the expected optimal investment under perfect information and the prior standard deviation as measure of epistemic uncertainty when effec- 
tiveness rate is controlled to be (a) γ = 0 . 1 and (b) γ = 0 . 5 . 
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t  vided distribution-free results on the relationship between mean
optimal investment levels and uncertainty of the prior distribu-
tion. Mean investment level before the learning stage will inform
budgeting, as it provides a prediction on the expected amount of
investment to a supplier that will be required post due-diligence.
We have shown that, ceteris paribus, we would reserve the least
amount of resources for the suppliers for whom we have the great-
est uncertainty. This may seem counter-intuitive as one might ex-
pect to reserve extra resources for improvement for those suppliers
about which there is greater uncertainty. However, we stress that
the budgeting of reserves is made in advance of learning activi-
ties and the actual investment in the supplier will be determined
only after further information has been collected. We provide an
analytical expression for the EVPI that can be used to assess the
beneﬁts of learning more about supplier quality processes before
investing in improvement activities. We also derive and evalu-
ate an approximation to the EVPI in the form of an upper and
lower bound, which supports practical computations within stan-
dard software, such as spreadsheets. By creating a visual represen-
tation of the relationships between expected proﬁt, effectiveness
and optimal investment, and examining the distribution of optimal
proﬁt for a given rate of effectiveness, we can communicate the
impact of uncertainty on the risks associated with making deci-
sions to managers, as shown in the industry example reported in
Section 4 . 
We reﬂect upon our insights in relation to the proposi-
tions made by Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Metters
(2007) mentioned in Section 2 . Although formed from an extensive
literature review in the context of inventory management, these
propositions also express more widely understood characteristics
of value of information, hence providing a suitable level at which
to consider the implications of our theoretical ﬁndings. Our mod-
elling framework is useful in situations when a decision is likely
to be sensitive to uncertainty since management support would
not be required if (nearly) perfect information exists about the
true non-conformance rate since the need to invest, or not, in a
supplier would be obvious. Therefore we are consistent with thePlease cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0roposition that sensitivity of the decision to uncertainty moder-
tes the relationship between the level of uncertainty and VOI. We
nd, although have not shown, that the expected value of per-
ect information increases as the prior variance increases, consis-
ent with the proposition that VOI will be larger when uncertainty
s greater. Learning activities are intended to reduce the epistemic
ncertainty from the prior level, but the rate of reduction will de-
end on the activity and so vary between activities. Better learn-
ng will be achieved when the prior distribution shifts in location
owards good or poor quality levels with less spread and this is in
ine with the proposition that the VOI increases with respect to the
evel of marginal information. Our approach is predicated upon the
iew that information has value if it has the potential to change
ecisions. Our effectiveness rate of a supplier improvement activ-
ty essentially provides a mapping from the current to an intended
uality performance state of the supplier and so corresponds to
 supplier’s ability to respond to buyer-led improvement activities
iven operating constraints. 
.2. Limitations and further work 
We have focused upon deriving analytical expressions for the
alue of perfect information in the context of supplier develop-
ent investment decisions. This presumes all epistemic uncer-
ainty is removed and so practically the expected value of per-
ect information only provides the supply chain manager with an
pper limit of how much to spend on learning. We can envis-
ge situations where the manager might consider various activ-
ties to learn about supplier quality, implying that reduction in
pistemic uncertainty about the true non-conformance rate might
ary according to the characteristics of different activities. Thus
e may obtain more, but not necessarily perfect, information.
ur modelling framework can accommodate this situation allow-
ng the manager to assess the levels of uncertainty associated with
he non-conformance rate following a learning activity to deter-
ine whether it is cost effective. However, we may be required
o use simulations to assess situations where partial information isnt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
44 
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Fained, learning is not perfect and residual epistemic uncertainty
emains. 
We have focused upon assessing the upper limit of a further
eduction in epistemic uncertainty because we were motivated by
he challenge posed by the industrial project. Our industry partners
ere not concerned with the option of delaying key learning activ-
ties; instead they were interested in whether or not to implement
he learning activities, such as site visits and additional audits dur-
ng the early phase of supplier relations. Hence our focus has been
n obtaining the expected value of perfect information as an upper
imit for all further data gathering processes, which would include
eal options. A real option approach to this problem would be in-
eresting to develop more formally and would be appropriate to
odelling partial information, insofar as another branch could be
dded to the decision tree to represent a delay in the decision to
nvest and to consider the NPV of the associated costs and beneﬁts
o such an alternative. 
We have focused upon decisions relating to a supplier newly
ntegrated to a company’s supply base in a context where the lead
imes allow for both learning and improvement activities to be
nitiated before the regular supply of parts starts. However, a re-
ated problem is that of developing existing suppliers with whom
he company has a past relationship. Conceptually, our Bayesian
tochastic modelling framework supports decisions regarding ex-
sting suppliers since it is possible to determine appropriate prob-
bility distributions using relevant historical data for the supplier
f interest. 
We have assumed a Gamma prior distribution. Our choice is
ligned with our underlying probability model, which is suﬃ-
iently ﬂexible to represent many epistemic uncertainty scenarios.
e make the common assumption that non-conformances follow a
oisson distribution. The assumptions support the mathematics of
he methods developed and can be validated using standard sta-
istical model checks. However, now that our framework has been
rticulated, a future challenge is to develop a wider class of proba-
ility models that might be suitable to capture different supplier
ata patterns. This might be especially useful if we extend the
et of performance characteristics beyond quality to, for example,
ate deliveries, or consider situations when there is anticipated im-
rovement in supplier quality as might be expected for start-up
ompanies or new production technologies. 
The EVPI can be expanded to assess the value of learning about
he effectiveness parameter γ . Assessing the uncertainty about γ
ay be complicated by the confounding effect of the supplier’s
illingness to engage in development activities. Additionally, when
here is value in knowing the effectiveness of an intervention prior
o engagement then learning about both the non-conformance and
ffectiveness rates is needed to assess the net impact. Develop-
ng a bivariate model to simultaneously assess the EVPI for both
on-conformance rate and improvement effectiveness would al-
ow the synergies of learning within activities and the depen-
ency between the uncertainties to be analysed. Modelling the
pistemic uncertainty in the effectiveness rate within the model
lso presents additional challenges for elicitation of the prior. 
We express the buyer loss due to a non-conforming part sup-
lied as an unknown parameter, which is typical in the litera-
ure. For example, Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Met-
ers (2007) ﬁnd that few studies in an inventory management con-
ext report total costs of scenarios considered in value of infor-
ation analysis in the inventory context. We made this modelling
hoice partly because of the challenge of accessing ﬁnancial data
nd estimating such costs accurately, but also because we found
hat expressing choices relative to this loss is more useful to sup-
ly chain managers since it accords with their practice on penal-
ies. There is a need to provide further guidance in the articulation
f these costs even if only for applications support, since we knowPlease cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0rom our theoretical and empirical work that they will also impact
he optimal decision. 
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ppendix A 
Let N i denote the number of non-conformances realised in the
 th future time epoch, v i denote the value of a non-conformance
ealised in the i th epoch, t i denote the exposure to risk in the i th
poch, and r denote the discount for one epoch. As before x is the
ne-off investment made at time 0 and γ is the effectiveness rate.
hen we can express the proﬁt expression in Eq. (3.4) as the NPV
f proﬁt, P , as follows 
 = 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i N i (1 − e −γ x ) 
(1 + r) i − x 
he expectation of P with respect to N i is given by 
 = 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i αβ t i (1 − e −γ x ) 
(1 + r) i − x = 
α
β
(1 − e −γ x ) 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i t i 
(1 + r) i − x 
hich can be re-expressed as shown below in the form consistent
ith the expression in Eq. (3.5) . 
[ P ] = α
β
(1 − e −γ x ) v t − x, 
here v t = ∑ ∀ i v i t i (1+ r) i . 
ppendix B 
Proof of Proposition 1 . 
 
∗ ≡
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
)
γ
, 
dx ∗
dγ
≡
1 − ln ( v tγ ) − ln 
(
α
β
)
γ 2 
 = γ
x ∗
dx ∗
dγ
= 
1 − ln ( v tγ ) − ln 
(
α
β
)
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
) = 1 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
) − 1 
roof of Proposition 2 . 
First we establish the following expression which we use of in
he derivation of the proof: 
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(
β
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( α) 
(
β
v tγ
) j 
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(
1 ;α + j, β
v tγ
))
.
here F 
(
1 ;α + j, βv tγ
)
is the cumulative distribution function of
 Gamma distribution evaluated at 1 with shape parameter α + j
nd scale parameter βv tγ . 
Note that: 
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β
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e −
β
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∞ ∑ 
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(
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k 1=0 
( α + j + k 1 ) 
. nt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
44 
14 J. Quigley et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 0 0 0 (2017) 1–16 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: EOR [m5G; June 14, 2017;4:57 ] 
Table C.3 
Ratio of logarithm of upper bound (UB) to true EVPI over simulated parameter ranges. 
Effectiveness rate γ Shape parameter range α Scale parameter range β Min ln ( UB 
EVPI 
) α value at min β value at min Max ln ( UB 
EVPI 
) α value at max β value at max 
0.1 [0.001,0.1] [0.001,0.1] 0.588 0.1 0.001 16.797 0.001 0.1 
0.1 [0.001,0.1] [0.1,1] 7.489 0.1 0.1 26.522 0.01 1 
0.1 [0.001,0.1] [1,10] 21.858 0.1 1 123.074 0.01 10 
0.1 [0.1,1] [0.001,0.1] 0.125 1 0.01 7.489 0.1 0.1 
0.1 [0.1,1] [0.1,1] 2.339 1 0.1 21.858 0.1 1 
0.1 [0.1,1] [1,10] 15.867 1 1 118.364 0.1 10 
0.1 [1,10] [0.001,0.1] 0.009 10 0.01 2.339 1 0.1 
0.1 [1,10] [0.1,1] 0.125 10 0.1 15.867 1 1 
0.1 [1,10] [1,10] 3.86 10 1 110.875 1 10 
0.5 [0.001,0.1] [0.001,0.1] 0.116 0.1 0.001 13.277 0.001 0.1 
0.5 [0.001,0.1] [0.1,1] 3.907 0.1 0.1 14.607 0.01 1 
0.5 [0.001,0.1] [1,10] 9.93 0.1 1 38.418 0.01 10 
0.5 [0.1,1] [0.001,0.1] 0.011 1 0.01 3.907 0.1 0.1 
0.5 [0.1,1] [0.1,1] 0.215 1 0.1 9.93 0.1 1 
0.5 [0.1,1] [1,10] 15.867 1 1 118.364 0.1 10 
0.5 [1,10] [0.001,0.1] 0.001 10 0.01 0.215 1 0.1 
0.5 [1,10] [0.1,1] 0.011 10 0.1 4.508 1 1 
0.5 [1,10] [1,10] 0.186 10 1 27.37 1 10 
0.9 [0.001,0.1] [0.001,0.1] 0.06 0.1 0.001 12.354 0.001 0.1 
0.9 [0.001,0.1] [0.1,1] 2.973 0.1 0.1 12.5 0.01 1 
0.9 [0.001,0.1] [1,10] 7.807 0.1 1 27.916 0.01 10 
0.9 [0.1,1] [0,0.1] 0.001 1 0.01 2.973 0.1 0.1 
0.9 [0.1,1] [0.1,1] 0.039 1 0.1 7.807 0.1 1 
0.9 [0.1,1] [1,10] 15.867 1 1 118.364 0.1 10 
0.9 [1,10] [0,001,0.1] 0 10 0.01 0.039 1 0.1 
0.9 [1,10] [0.1,1] 0.001 10 0.1 2.427 1 1 
0.9 [1,10] [1,10] 0.017 10 1 17.205 1 10 
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cNow we derive the main result. Let Z = v tγ. Since a Gamma ran-
dom variable is closed under scale transformation we can express
Z ∼ Gamma 
(
α, βv tγ
)
. We seek the following: 
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( i − j ) ! j! ( −1 ) j 
( v tγ
β
) j ( α+ j ) 
( α) 
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + j, βv tγ
))
γ
which gives an expression for the EVPI. 
Proof of Theorem 1 . 
The optimal level of investment under perfect information is
given by X PI = max ( 0 , ln ( υtγ) ) . The expectation of X PI when the
non-conformance rate is known to exceed the threshold can be
expressed as in the following. 
E 
[
X PI 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
= ln ( υtγ ) + E 
[
ln ( ) 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
Consider the following Taylor Expansion of ln ( ) about
μ
> 1 υtγ
= E 
[

∣∣ > 1 υtγ ], where  is a random variable de-Please cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0ned on the positive real numbers with variance σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
=
 
[
(  − μ) 2 
∣∣ > 1 υtγ ]. 
n ( ) = ln 
(
μ> 1 υtγ
)
+ 
(
 − μ> 1 υtγ
)
μ> 1 υtγ
+ o 
((
 − μ> 1 υtγ
)2 )
∗
We make two observations: 
i) As ln ( ) is a concave function then we know ln ( ) ≤
ln 
(
μ
> 1 υtγ
)
+ 
(
−μ
> 1 υtγ
)
μ
> 1 υtγ
ii) Taking the expectation of both sides of ( ∗) results in the follow-
ing: 
E 
[
ln ( ) 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
= ln 
(
μ> 1 υtγ
)
+ o 
(
E 
[(
 − μ> 1 υtγ
)2 ∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
])
Re-arranging we have the following bound. 
n 
(
μ> 1 υtγ
)
− E 
[
ln ( ) 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
= o 
(
σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
)
. 
So from observation i) we know that 
 
[
X PI 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
≤ ln 
(
υtγμ> 1 υtγ
)
nd only achieves equality in the deterministic case, i.e. when
2 
> 1 υtγ
= 0 . 
From observation ii) we know that the expected investment de-
reases as uncertainty increases, i.e. as σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
increases. nt: The value of information under uncertainty, European Journal 
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 Proof of Proposition 3 . 
Following the derivation of Proposition 2 , we seek to ﬁnd: 
 Z [ E [ P ; x PI | Z ] ] = 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − 1 − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz 
= 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
d z −
∞ ∫ 
1 
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
γ ( α) 
d z ≤
∞ ∫ 
0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz −
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
))
= v t α
β
−
( α) − ln 
(
β
v tγ
)
γ
−
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
))
. 
Proof of Proposition 4 . 
The difference between the EVPI and the upper bound pro-
ided in Proposition 3 comes from integration over the range [0,
 ) rather than [1, ∞ ). As such, the error is given by: 
rror = 
1 ∫ 
0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
dz 
1 ∫ 
0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
( α) 
d z ≤
1 ∫ 
0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 
(
1 − z 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
))
( α) 
d z 
= 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
1 ∫ 
0 
(
z α − z α−1 ln ( z ) 
)(
1 − z 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
))
dz 
= 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
1 ∫ 
0 
(
z α − z α−1 ln ( z ) −
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
)
z α+1 + 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
)
z α ln ( z ) 
)
dz 
= 
(
β
v tγ
)α
( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e −
β
v tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) . 
ppendix C 
The purpose of our numerical study is to understand the loss
f accuracy of the UB as an approximation to the EVPI. Hence,
e focus upon the region where the bound is likely to perform
oorly, informed by our theoretical results. Setting v = t = 1 , we
imulate combinations of the remaining parameters in the follow-
ng ranges: 0.001 ≤ α ≤ 1; 0.001 ≤ β ≤ 10; and for 0.1 ≤ γ ≤ 1.0.
able C.3 summarises the results for effectiveness rates of 0.1, 0.5,
nd 0.9, and selected 27 partitions of the parameter space for the
hape and scale parameters. Reported are the minimum and max-
mum values of the ratio of the UB to the EVPI in each partition.
ore than 20,0 0 0 simulations have been run in total to calculate
hese statistics. Lesser (greater) accuracy is implied when the log
atio of the UB to the true EVPI is larger (smaller). By showing the
aximums and minimums of the log ratio over the controlled pa-
ameter intervals, we gain insight into the best and worst accuracy
ithin each simulation set. 
Our results show that the accuracy of the UB increases as the
hape parameter α increases, which is consistent with Corollary 1 .
n addition, the accuracy of the UB also increases for increasing
alues of effectiveness rate, γ , and decreasing values of the scale
arameter β . Therefore, the upper bound becomes a poorer ap-
roximation as the effectiveness rate reduces and the values of the
cale parameter increases. This implies that for α > 1 and β < 0.1
hen the error between the approximation given by the UB and the
rue EVPI can be as high as a factor of 10. Please cite this article as: J. Quigley et al., Supplier quality improveme
of Operational Research (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.0eferences 
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